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Abstract. This article finds evidences highlighting that the Brazilian monetary policy is 
divergent from Taylor principles, from data over January 2005 to May 2013, and using 
regressions estimated by OLS and GMM. Especially, the inflationary expectations do not 
show robust effects on the Selic rate, while the inertial degree of the latter denotes a current 
pro-cyclical bias. Furthermore, the article tested for the effects of the Subprime crisis and 
the domestic currency undervaluation on the Selic level. The empirical results suggest that 
the Subprime crisis monetary authorities have preferred to stabilize or expand output, 
against the inflation stabilization, despite the Brazilian inflation target regime since 1999. 
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1. Introduction 
ne of the most relevant issues in the monetary policy literature concerns 
with the Central Banks’ strategy in setting the policy instrument over time. 
In general, monetary authorities adopt a short term interest rate as the main 
instrument in making monetary policy, in order to control output and inflationary 
dynamics in relation to their respective potential and target levels (Taylor, 1993; 
Ball, 1999; Blinder, 2006; Galí & Gertler, 2007). It has been verified that monetary 
policy rules are flexible and change over time, or according to countries’ specific 
preferences; however, in a broad sense, basic interest rates depend on all the 
information dynamics that causes the inflationary process, which is the Central 
Bank’s overriding goal in long term. 
On the other hand, assuming that the monetary policy, under inflation targeting 
regime, is determined by exchange rates fluctuations is a controversial subject. By 
assumption, under inflation targeting the main goal of the Central Bank is to 
maintain the observed and expected inflation in convergence to the inflation target. 
Hence, the monetary authority does not need to be directly affected by the 
exchange rate movement, as the latter is freely governed by the foreign currency 
market (Obstfeld & Rogoff, 1995; Svensson, 1997). However, in empirical terms 
there is no contradiction between a credible inflation targeting regime and 
empirical correlations of policy interest rates with exchange rate movements, 
because such movements can imply changes of the consumer inflation dynamics 
forward by pass-through effects. This idea is consistent with the assumptions in 
Svensson (2000). 
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Brazil has made an important effort to control inflation rates in the last decades. 
The 70’s, 80’s and the beginning of the 90’s were years of hyperinflation and low 
output growth in the Brazilian economy. In turn, the Real Plan – i.e. a plan 
designed for stabilizing prices –, implemented in 1994, was able to reduce 
consumer inflation rates expressively, but the volatile international financial 
context of the second half of the 90’s, marked by the Mexican, Asian Tigers and 
Russian financial disruptions, made more difficult to control inflation through 
exchange rate targets in Brazil. So, in 1999, it introduced the inflation targeting 
regime in order to combine a credible nominal anchor with a floating exchange 
rate. Since that period, the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) has adjusted the basic 
interest rate (Selic rate) as its main instrument for taking the observed and expected 
inflation to the inflation target.  
Since 2003 the Brazilian government has been conducted by the Workers’ Party 
(Partido dos Trabalhadores - PT), a centre-left political party, which main 
announced goal was to eliminate income inequalities with a context of stable 
growth and prices. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was its first president, from 2003-
2010, while Dilma Roussef started her government in 2011. It is important to 
highlight that Rousseff’s government represented a kind of tuning-point for 
Brazil’s monetary policy, which indeed could be observed from 2010 as an effort 
to make it more flexible (Modenesi, Martins, & Modenesi, 2012). However, 
Roussef’s government maintained monetary and fiscal incentives that were 
implemented to offset the Subprime crisis’ effects, despite an expressive economic 
recovery had been observed since 2010. In turn, it was actually from 2005 that the 
inflation target was definitely stabilized (at 4.5% per year measured by the Broad 
National Consumer Price Index). In such a context, we can regard 2005 as the year 
from which the Brazilian inflation targeting regime has been consolidated in formal 
terms.  
Although such a consolidation has been performed at the institutional level, the 
observed consumer inflation has not converged to the inflation target in Brazil over 
the last years. As we can see in Graph-1, even though from around April 2006 to 
December 2007 Brazil had experienced a low inflation context, after that the 
annual consumer inflation rate has stayed generally above the target. Indeed, a 
simple mean calculated on the series of consumer inflation deviation is enough to 
show a positive value (about 0.85 or 85 basis points). Such a persistent positive 
deviation should be avoided particularly because the current Brazilian inflation 
target (an annual 4.5%) is not still an optimal long term target, at least if we look at 
the long term inflation rate in developed countries. Long term differences between 
the domestic inflation and the foreign inflation have expressive impacts that are 
translated into competitiveness gaps, among other things.  
In turn, we can observe that the BCB has adjusted the Selic rate cyclically and 
with a general tendency of reduction over time. Indeed, the reduction of the 
difference between the Selic rate and the consumer inflation over time is clear, that 
is, the BCB has decreased the ex post real interest rate (Selic rate – consumer 
inflation) over such a period. However, there was not a structural downturn 
movement of the consumer inflation or inflation deviation at the same time. It 
suggests that, although the Selic rate cycle can be associated with the other 
variables’ cycle, the decreasing Selic rate level over time could be associated with 
a discretionary decision of the BCB. Starting from 10.3% per year in January 2005, 
the ex post real Selic rate converged to 0.9 per year in May 2013 (Graph-2). This 
giant monetary impulse cannot be explained by the output and inflation dynamics, 
but will certainly impact such a dynamics. In turn, the ex ante real Selic rate (Selic 
rate – expected consumer inflation) had similar trend, but with values softly above 
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the ex post one. This is because the public probably expected an increase of the 
Selic rate forward due to the current and expected inflation deviation.  
Thus, concerning the Selic cycle, how does the Brazilian Central Bank react to 
the main macroeconomic fluctuations over time? The literature on inflation 
targeting regimes associates optimal interest rate adjustments with the convergence 
of inflation to its target, even if transitory deviations occur due to shocks 
(Svensson, 1997). Therefore, an appropriate reaction of Brazil’s basic interest rate 
is important because it can contribute to eliminate those observed deviations, 
thereby allowing for a lower long term inflation target.  
 
 
GRAPH 1: Consumer inflation, inflation target, inflation deviation and Selic 
rate in Brazil from Jan/2005 to May/2013 
 
In turn, the pass-through effect of exchange rate changes on consumer inflation 
is an important related issue. There has been a theoretical and an empirical 
literature regarding the causes of high or low pass-through effects across the 
countries (Edwards, 2006; Taylor, 2000; McCarthy, 2000). Despite possible 
different determinants on the pass-through degree, a more relevant question for this 
current article is whether the Central Bank should take exchange rate movements 
into account when adjusting its basic interest rate. As the main goal of the inflation 
target regime is to control consumer inflation over time, and consumer prices have 
sensibility to exchange rate changes, it would not be strange if Central Banks 
adjusted their basic interest rates facing such changes, so as to avoid inflation 
deviations in relation to the announced targets.   
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One can highlight that through consolidating the inflation targeting regime, 
credibility gains can make Central Banks more autonomous against foreign factors, 
and so more committed to domestic factors such as consumer inflation and output 
dynamics. Indeed, such autonomy would be one of the advantages of the inflation 
targeting regime (Svensson, 1997; Bernanke & Mishkin, 1999) in comparison with 
other types of nominal anchors, such as exchange rate target regimes. Does that 
autonomy recently occur in Brazil?  
Furthermore, in 2008 and mainly in 2009 Brazil was expressively affected by 
the international financial crisis (Subprime crisis). Was there any structural change 
of the Brazilian monetary policy as a consequence of such a period? All these 
questions can be answered by estimating the way the BCB reacts to domestic and 
foreign variables. In turn, observing estimated monetary policy rules it is possible 
to make some judgments about the quality of basic interest rate adjustments 
concerning what is expected in terms of an effective commitment to announced 
inflation targets over time.   
The Section 2 presents a theoretical approach for dealing with monetary policy 
rules and some empirical evidences obtained for Brazil, while Section 3 shows the 
adopted data, the empirical strategy and the analysis of the results, which are 
compared to the empirical literature. At last, Section 4 presents the main 
conclusions, followed by the references and an Appendix. 
    
2. Monetary policy rules approach: Taylor principles 
A structural economic model under the inflation targeting regime is defined in 
Ball (1999a;b), Svensson (1999) and Galí & Gertler (2007), among others. The 
demand and output dynamics are expressed by a kind of stochastic IS curve, so that 
the output gap (yt) depends on its past value, on the short term interest rate 
deviations in the past periods (it-1), on the past exchange rate deviation (et-1 – et-2) i 
and on a demand shock (ε1t) with zero mean and constant variance: 
  
yt = b1yt-1 – b2it-1 + b3 (et-1 – et-2) + ε1t                 (1) 
 
Let b1, b2 and b3 be positive parameters. In turn, the inflationary dynamics is 
presented through a Phillips curve, so that the inflation rate deviation (πt) is caused 
by its past value (πt-1), by the lagged output gap (yt-1), by the current exchange rate 
deviation (et – et-1) and by a supply shock component (ε2t) with zero mean and 
constant variance; a1, a2 and a3 are also positive parameters: 
 
πt = a1πt-1 + a2yt-1 + a3(et – et-1) + ε2t                        (2)  
 
The Central Bank adopts a monetary policy rule in line with the Taylor rule, in 
which the basic interest rate is a function of output and inflation deviations in 
relation to their desirable values. The equilibrium real interest rate is given by rn 
and ΠT is the inflation target; c1 and c2 are positive parameters and ε3t is a policy 
innovation shock: 
 
it = rn + ΠT + c1yt-1 + c2πt-1 + ε3t        (3) 
However, the literature shows that Central Banks have an inertial behavior with 
regard to the basic interest rate adjustments (Woodford, 2003; Blinder, 2006). That 
is, in order to define in each moment the new value for the basic interest rate, 
policymakers give weight to its past values. It would be a form of smoothing the 
monetary policy, thereby avoiding interest rate’s abrupt movements and frequent 
reversions. Thus, the equation (3) receives an inertial component:   
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it = ρit-1 + (1 – ρ) [(rn + ΠT ) + c1yt-1 + c2πt-1] + ε4t     (4) 
 
Given 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 (the inertial coefficient), which gives weight to the past interest 
rate in determining the current interest rate formation, while ε4t is the policy 
innovation shock in the inertial rule. 
Some models have forward-looking nature, as the public’s expectations gain 
importance in affecting the authorities’ policy decisions. Haldane and Batini 
(1998), for instance, adopt the following instrument rule: 
 
rt = ρ rt-1 + (1 – ρ) rt* + θ [Et Πt+j – Πt*] + ϕ yt-1 + ε5t     (5) 
  
Given rt = [it – EtΠt+1] the expected real interest rate, that is, the difference 
between the nominal interest rate (it) and the expected inflation rate in the period t 
(EtΠt+1) for t+1. The equilibrium real interest rate is given by rt*, the inflation 
target is Πt* and ρ, θ and ϕ are positive parameters. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 
(1999), among others, adopt mainly forward-looking rules, instead of backward-
looking rules, as a good description for the basic interest rate behavior in 
economies in which the price stability is the Central Bank’s explicit or implicit 
target.  
Although the equation (5) is presented in real terms (i.e. a real Taylor rule) for 
the interest rate, it is usual to test for monetary policy rules in nominal terms. 
Hence, we can define the nominal Taylor rule for an open economy by taking the 
exchange rate change into account. The coefficient c3 expresses the sensibility of 
the basic interest rate adjustments to exchange rate changes. In theory, c3 > 0 so 
that the monetary policy has a countercyclical behavior facing the pass-through 
effect, that is, the effect of exchange rate movements on the consumer inflation: 
 
it = ρit-1 + (1 – ρ) [(rn + ΠT ) + c1yt-1 + c2( Et Πt+j – Πt*) + c3(et-1 – et-2)] + ε6t  (6) 
 
Another important feature of the Taylor rule such as (6) is related to c2 value. 
The so-called Taylor principle defines c2 as exceeding unity (Clarida et al. 1999) to 
make real interest rates moving counter-cyclicallyii. When c2 >1 the real interest 
rate increases as a response to an increase of the expected inflation deviation. It 
clearly corresponds to θ > 0 in (5). 
 
3. Related empirical literature 
In the international empirical literature, Clarida, Galí, & Gertler (2000) 
estimated the Taylor rule for the US economy through implementing OLS. The 
authors found that the FED’s monetary policy became more aggressive (θ > 0) 
from 1979 (post-Volcker period) than what was observed until this year (when 
θ < 0).  
These results that show a kind of a break in the US monetary policy from the 
Volcker’s mandate are also found in authors such as Cogley & Sargent (2001) and 
Boivin (2006), although these last adopted different empirical methods in 
comparison with Clarida et al. (2000).   
Specifically in relation to the Brazilian economy, Minella, de Freitas, Goldfajn, 
& Muinhos (2003) considered the expected inflation rate deviation in relation to 
the inflation target as a variable determining the monetary policy instrument, 
through a regression study for the period from Jun/1999 to Jun/2002. Moreover, it 
was tested a regression equation with two lags of the basic interest rate so as to 
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eliminate the serial autocorrelation problem, which was observed in the model with 
only one lag for the basic interest rate.  
The authors attained the following main evidences: a) it was verified a high 
inertial coefficient (ρ) by varying between 0.7-0.8 or more; b) the output gap 
coefficient did not present statistical significance in general, and, in other cases, it 
presented a signal that diverged from the theory; c) the coefficient for the expected 
inflation component (such as θ), in general, obtained values higher than unity and 
significance at 1% level. This evidence is consistent with the Taylor principle, 
according to which a monetary policy that is efficient in controlling inflation 
dynamics, at low and stable levels, has a reaction that is higher than the (expected) 
inflationary variation; d) the authors also tested for the inclusion of an exchange 
rate as an explainable variable in the monetary policy rule, but its coefficient was 
not statistically significant.  
Holland (2005), as well as Barbosa & Soares (2006), also found a counter-
cyclical behavior of the Selic rate facing expected inflation changes, suggesting a 
monetary policy’s appropriate response to make observed inflation convergent to 
targets. Concerning the exchange rate, theses studies have attained evidences 
showing a positive response of the Selic rate to an undervaluation of Brazil’s Real 
against the US Dollar. In the same line, Furlani, Portugal, & Laurini (2010), by 
means of Bayesian methods, have obtained results of expressive positive responses 
of the Brazilian basic interest rate to an increase of exchange rates over time. Such 
evidences mean that, although Brazil does not determine a target for the exchange 
rate, the effects of the latter on observed and expected inflation can induce 
systematic reactions of the Selic rate in order to avoid persistent inflation 
deviations.  
The Table-1 presents some relevant parameters’ values in the literature for the 
Brazilian case with regard to Taylor rules, including also Modenesi (2008) and 
Nobre & Moreira (2014) as references to help in analyzing the empirical results 
that the current work will estimate forward. 
 
TABLE 1: Summary of some relevant parameters’ values for Brazil  
Work/Parameter Inertial degree Expected inflation  Output gap  Exchange rate  
Minella et al. (2003) 0.7 to 0.8 (***) 
1.42 to 1.78 
(**) 






0.45 to 2.46 
(**) 
2.33 to 4.35 
(**) 




Barbosa & Soares 
(2006)Γ 
0.27 to 0.54 
(***) 
0.11 to 0.28 
(***) 
0.09 to 0.15 
(***) 




0.86 to 0.9 
(***) Not tested 
0.32 to 0.35 
(*) Not tested 
Furlani et al. (2010)Ψ 0.103 to 0.92 (**) Not tested 
4.66 to 5.41 
(**) 
4.61 to 4.85 
(**) 
Nobre and Moreira 
(2014) 
0.99 
(***) 0.17 to 0.19 -0.007 to -0.009 0.22 
Notes: Significance level in parenthesis: (***), (**) and (*) mean, respectively, significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level. Ξ For nominal exchange rate depreciation; Γ Dependent variable: first difference for the 
basic interest rate; Ψ Through Bayesian methods. Source: Own elaboration. 
 
4. Data, Integration Order and Empirical Strategy 
All the variables below were collected for the time sample from January/2005 to 
May/2013 iii  and their description and sources are shown in Table-2. We also 
consider the possibility of a structural break of the Brazilian monetary policy due 
to the Subprime crisis. To allow for such a possibility, we can include an additional 
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variable or a dummy variable (SUBPRIME). The Brazilian economy’s GDP (Y) 
was the variable selected for defining the values of the dummy variable, thus 
giving 1.0 to the months in which the GDP presented strong contraction, and 0.0 to 
months in which it presented a behavior compatible with its historical trend. Hence, 
SUBPRIME was defined with 1.0 from November 2008 to November 2009. 
Otherwise, it presents 0.0.  
 
TABLE 2: Time series adopted into the empirical analysis: description and 
sources 
Series Description and Sources 
I Brazilian basic and effective interest rate (SELIC) (source: www.bcb.gov.br) 
EXP_P Accumulated expected consumer inflation for 12 months forward (source: www.bcb.gov.br) 
P Accumulated consumer inflation in 12 months, by the Broad Consumer Prices (source: www.ibge.gov.br); 
Y Brazilian proxy for the GDP on a monthly basis, measured by the BCB (source: www.bcb.gov.br); 
E Brazilian nominal exchange rate of Real (R$) against US dollar (source: www.ipeadata.gov.br). 
SUBPRIME Dummy to capture effects of the Subprime crisis. Assumes 1.0 from Nov/2008 to Nov/2009; 0.0 otherwise. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
The first step with time series studies is to verify the integration order of the 
variables, that is, if they can be considered as stationary at level or if there exists 
the necessity for applying first differences or even higher differences to make them 
stationary. Hence, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), the Phillips-Perron (PP) 
and the Dickey-Fuller GLS unit root tests were performed as a way for defining 
their integration order. As we can view in Table-3, the following time series can be 
regarded as presenting unit root in level: EXP_P, P and Y; in turn, the stationary 
variables in level are I and E.   
 
TABLE 3: ADF, PP and DF-GLS Unit root tests (statistics) 
 
ADF1 PP2 DF-GLS ADF3 PP4 DF-GLS 
 
Series Level test 1st Difference test I(n) 
I -4.1431*** -1.6846* -3.9149*** - - - I(0) 
EXP_P -3.0211 -3.1603* -1.2966 -8.2066*** -8.1471*** -7.2775*** I(1) 
P -2.5326 -2.2911 -1.8617 -5.1519*** -5.1139*** -5.2509*** I(1) 
Y -2.1634 -2.3500 -2.2238 -9.3779*** -9.4367*** -8.6657*** I(1) 
E -2.5829* -2.6650* -1.3324 - - - I(0) 
Notes: (1) Only significant constant for P and E; (2) none significant component for I and only 
constant for E; (3) none for EXP_P and P and only constant for Y; (4) none for EXP_P and P and 
only constant for Y.  Statistical significance at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). Source: Own 
elaboration. 
 
In such a case, as the time series are not jointly I(1), cointergation approaches 
are not appropriate in Engle and Granger (1987)’s view and the method of 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) can be adopted with the unit root variables (EXP_P, 
P and Y) in their first difference form, while the stationary ones (I and E) in their 
level form, thereby resulting in a short-term dynamics estimation.  So, in order to 
estimate monetary policy rules or Taylor rules for the Brazilian economy, this work 
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implemented such a method.  However, a better way to correct common problems 
of heteroscedasticy, residual autocorrelation and also endogeneity is by adopting 
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) (Hansen, 1982). Hence, we can 
specify, for robustness purposes, a sample of GMM regressions and compare their 
results with the previous OLS findings.  
Before applying GMM estimates, we should observe if the instrumental 
variables are exogenous. Thus such instrumental series were defined from t-1 to 
earlier periods thereby matching this hypothesis, following Johnston (1984). 
Moreover, an analysis of overidentification was implemented (by means of the J-
test), which aimed at testing for the correct specification of the instrumental 
variables (Gragg, 1983; Hansen, 1982).   
 
5. OLS estimates and analysis 
We can observe the specifications through OLS estimates in Table-4. All 
regressions have presented adjusted R2 above 0.9. The OLS estimation was made 
by the Newey and West (1987) estimatoriv, which is consistent for correcting the 
existence of residual autocorrelation that was suggested by the LM test for all the 
specifications.  
The inertial coefficient presents statistical significance at 1% in all models and 
its value stays from 0.992 to 1.013, thereby showing that the BCB implemented a 
high degree of gradualism to adjust the basic interest rate. Regarding the forward-
looking coefficient, all the specifications generated estimates without statistical 
significance and their estimated values stay far from exceeding unity (i.e. the 
Taylor principle). In this respect, such a policy cannot be regarded as counter-
cyclical, as it is not consistent with counter-cyclical movements of real interest 
rates (Clarida et al., 1999). In turn, the backward-looking component, relating D(P) 
to I changes, has presented statistical significance in Equations 1 and 3, and its 
estimates have positive values, including Equation 5. Despite these results, such 
estimates are also far from exceeding unity, thereby corroborating the pro-cyclical 
bias of the BCB over the studied sample.  
Concerning the monetary policy’s reaction to GDP dynamics, the associated 
parameter has not presented statistical significance and its value is negative in all 
models, that is, in contrast with the literature prediction: the BCB reacts pro-
cyclically to GDP changes. Such strange empirical evidence regarding the output 
component is also found in other empirical works for Brazil, such as Minella et al. 
(2003) and Holland (2005).      
With regard to the role of exchange rate movements, we can observe that such a 
variable does not impact the BCB’s interest rate with statistical significance. 
Moreover, its estimated value is negative (Eq.3-Eq.6), showing that an 
undervaluation of the domestic currency is followed by a decrease of the Selic rate. 
This is also a contradictory response under the inflation targeting regime, as an 
undervaluation generally causes higher inflation levels (Edwards, 2006; Taylor, 
2000; McCarthy, 2000). We can interpret this result in the following way: the BCB 
has an empirical preference for stabilizing or stimulating output changes in Brazil, 
so that when facing trade-offs regarding output-inflation stabilization, the monetary 
policy clearly demonstrates preference to output, which is consistent with a pro-
cyclical reaction of the Selic rate. So, the pass-through effect has not been 
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Eq.1 Eq.2  Eq.3 Eq.4 Eq.5 Eq.6 
C -0.0812 -0.0119 0.4525 0.5881 0.4044 0.5014 
 
(0.2162) (0.2202) (0.4916) (0.5349) (0.4845) (0.5222) 
 
[-0.3758] [-0.0543] [0.9205] [1.0994] [0.8348] [0.9600] 
I(-1) 0.9986*** 0.9922*** 1.0132*** 1.0093*** 1.0042*** 0.9988*** 
 
(0.0177) (0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0186) (0.0181) (0.0173) 
 
[56.2825] [54.7648] [55.4739] [54.2351] [55.2130] [57.6270] 
D(EXP_P(-1)) 0.2110 0.3950 0.1339 0.2923 0.1415 0.2703 
 
(0.2511) (0.2618) (0.2064) (0.2205) (0.2012) (0.2032) 
 




















 D(Y(-1)) -0.0181 -0.0027 -0.0197 -0.0058 -0.0239 -0.0137 
 
(0.0227) (0.0256) (0.0266) (0.0303) (0.0329) (0.0371) 
 
[-0.7970] [-0.1067] [-0.7389] [-0.1922] [-0.7249] [-0.3717] 
E(-1) 
  
-0.3629 -0.4119 -0.2672 -0.2830 
   
(0.2459) (0.2757) (0.2419) (0.2740) 
   
[-1.4755] [-1.4938] [-1.1045] [-1.0329] 
SUBPRIME(-1) 
    
-0.2204 -0.2743 
     
(0.1571) (0.1471) 
     
[-1.4031] [-1.8647] 
Adj. R-squared 0.9869 0.9861 0.9872 0.9865 0.9875 0.9871 
F-statistic 1850.76 2325.81 1519.01 1803.77 1295.61 1504.64 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LM (Prob:02 lags) 0.0005 0.0000 0.0024 0.0001 0.0029 0.0002 
Note: () for standard error and [] for t-statistic; *** for statistical significance at1%, ** at 5% and * at 
10%. Source: Own elaboration. 
 
In turn, regarding the role of the Subprime crisis, we cannot verify statistical 
significance for its correspondent parameter, but it presents a negative value, 
suggesting that, broadly, if the BCB showed any change in its monetary policy 
conduction, the resulting response would be to decrease basic interest rates in 
Brazil, accompanied by several Central Banks from 2008 to 2009.  
 
6. GMM estimates and analysis  
The GMM estimates for those monetary policy rules are viewed in Table-5. The 
inertial coefficient maintained its statistical significance in all regressions and its 
value varies from 0.957 to 0.988, thus corroborating the previous estimates from 
OLS regressions and confirming the high degree of gradualism of the BCB. 
Concerning inflationary expectations, the GMM estimates obtain statistical 
significance for Equations 2 and 6, but their values are much less than unity, so that 
the monetary policy does not denote a counter-cyclical role in such an aspect. In 
such a case, the current estimates are closer to those of Barbosa & Soares (2006) 
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and Nobre & Moreira (2014) and diverge from those of Minella et al. (2003) and 
Holland (2005). 
Regarding the back-warding component (P), the results are similar to those from 
OLS regressions in terms of statistical significance and coefficient values, thereby 
suggesting a pro-cyclical monetary policy. In turn, the output component 
maintained its non-significance and its negative signal, which also reinforce such 
monetary policy’s pro-cyclical pattern. Hence, in such an aspect our estimates are 
closer to those of Minella et al. (2003) and Holland (2005) (that is, an undesirable 
pro-cyclical policy) and diverge from those of Barbosa & Soares (2006) and 
Modenesi (2008), which have found positive coefficients, but lower than the values 
for the other estimated componentsv. 
However, the GMM estimates (Table-5) brought some new features in 
comparison with the OLS ones (Table-4). Basically, we can highlight the 
significant role of the exchange rate and the Subprime crisis on Selic adjustments 
over time (Equations 3 to 6 in Table-5). On the one hand, exchange rate changes 
have statistically significant inverse correlation with Selic in Equations 3 and 4, if 
we do not control for Subprime effects. On the other hand, such inverse relations 
are not consistent with counter-cyclical responses to pass-through effects. As we 
viewed in the theoretical section, that coefficient should be positive under inflation 
targeting regimes.  
Furthermore, if we control for Subprime effects (Equations 5 and 6), the 
correspondent coefficient presents statistical significance at 1% and negative value, 
confirming the OLS estimates in terms of coefficient values, but with higher 
values. While the OLS estimates have found values around 0.2 for the Subprime 
effect, the GMM estimates have obtained coefficients around 1.0. These findings 
demonstrate that the BCB had a preference for decreasing Selic rate especially 
from Nov/2008 to Nov/2009 as a way to offset the downturn movement of Brazil’s 
GDP. It is important to highlight that all the models have presented high adjusted 
R2 level and the J-statistics have not rejected the null hypothesis across the six 
regressions, corroborating the assumption of correct specification of the models 
(Craigg, 1983; Hansen, 1982). Besides, we also tested for a potential structural 
break on the behavior of the monetary policy as a consequence of the beginning of 
Rousseff’s mandate, from January 2011. Thus, we adopted another dummy 
variable, assuming 1.0 from such a month to May 2013, and 0.0 otherwise. 
However, when we replaced the Subprime dummy by the Rousseff one, into both 
the OLS and GMM regressions, we did not identify statistical significance for the 
related coefficient, so that we can adequately regard the Subprime crisis as the true 
structural change over the last years concerning Brazil’s monetary policy, and as 
the momentum of a deeper divergence from Taylor principles.    
 




Eq.1 Eq.2  Eq.3 Eq.4 Eq.5 Eq.6 
C 0.0197 0.2264* 1.0376*** 1.4063*** 0.1670** 0.9444** 
 
(0.1509) (0.1237) (0.3499) (0.2357) (0.5491) (0.4316) 
 
[0.1309] [1.8306] [2.9653] [5.9649] [2.1253] [2.1877] 
I(-1) 0.9849*** 0.9692*** 0.9882*** 0.9841*** 0.9575*** 0.9624** 
 
(0.0119) (0.0098) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0176) (0.0157) 
 
[82.2524] [98.7523] [73.7942] [73.6828] [54.2355] [60.9309] 
D(EXP_P(-1)) 0.2609 0.4004** 0.1683 0.1800 0.2123 0.1838*** 
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(0.1894) (0.1932) (0.1435) (0.1353) (0.1695) (0.1641) 
 




















 D(Y(-1)) -0.0080 0.0031 -0.0217 -0.0197 -0.0262 -0.0253 
 
(0.0201) (0.0180) (0.0242) (0.0241) (0.0435) (0.0403) 
 




0.5382*** -0.6914*** -0.3160 -0.2515 
   
(0.1553) (0.1205) (0.3405) (0.2856) 
   
[-3.4638] [-5.7364] [-0.9281] [-0.8837] 
SUBPRIME(-1) 




     
(0.3039) (0.2351) 
     
[-3.6848] [-4.2021] 
Adj. R-squared 0.9848 0.9845 0.9862 0.9862 0.9771 0.9799 
J-stat 11.2576 13.4618 9.7851 10.9886 6.9621 7.6460 
(J-Prob) 0.4219 0.3363 0.4595 0.4442 0.6410 0.6633 
Note: The instrumental variables were I(-1), I(-3), I(-5), D(P(-1)), D(P(-3)), D(P(-5)), D(EXP_P(-1)), 
D(EXP_P(-3)), D(EXP_P(-5)), D(Y(-1)), D(Y(-3)), D(Y(-5)), E(-1), E(-3), and E(-5); () for standard 
error and [] for t-statistic; *** for statistical significance at1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Source: Own 
elaboration. 
 
Therefore, taking both the OLS and GMM estimates into account, in general, 
the main remark is that the inertial coefficient presents higher magnitude than the 
estimates of the reviewed studies for the Brazilian case, except for some 
regressions made by Holland (2005), particularly in consistence with Nobre & 
Moreira (2014). This current evidence confirms the Brazilian Central Bank’s 
conservative behavior and, in fact, expresses an increase of its inertial degree over 
the last years. Moreover, we obtained evidences confirming the pro-cyclical bias of 
the BCB, concerning the responses to GDP, inflationary expectations, observed 
inflation and exchange rate changes, thus making clear a kind of intertemporal 
inconsistence of the monetary policy. Finally, the Subprime crisis had an effective 
role in inducing lower Selic levels in Brazil, but controlling for such a role does not 
eliminate the pro-cyclical bias regarding the other factors. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
Giving focus on the monetary policy’s higher inertial coefficient estimated in 
this work, in comparison with previous works for Brazil, and the lower forward-
looking component as well, it is possible to say the BCB has conducted its 
monetary policy in a worse way over the last years, thereby presenting a kind of 
turning-point that explains at least a part of the current inflationary deviations. 
Therefore, the main proposition is to calibrate the Brazilian monetary policy for a 
more activist (less gradual) policy, as well as more expressive responses of the 
Selic rate to expected inflation changes and output gaps. 
In turn, with respect to exchange rate fluctuations, that is, the “mirage” of 
exchange rate targets, Obstfeld & Rogoff (1995) argued that monetary policy 
should not be conducted for controlling the exchange rate, although the latter can 
be useful in signaling important macroeconomic features for the Central Bank’s 
decisions. The literature on inflation targeting regimes is controversial when the 
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subject is the role of exchange rate for the monetary policy strategy. For instance, 
Svensson (1997) argued that inflation targeting regimes should not have 
intermediate targets, such as exchange rates, but in a transitory period, and only if 
no conflict with the inflation target arises. On the other hand, Ball (1999b) suggests 
that under inflation targeting regime and opened economies, the Central Bank’s 
optimal instrument rule is defined as a weighted sum of interest rate and exchange 
rate, thereby giving a direct role for the latter in making monetary policy, despite 
maintaining the long run inflation in convergence to the target is still the main goal 
of the monetary authority. In other words, “All real-world inflation-targeting 
economies are quite open economies with free capital mobility, where shocks 
originating in the rest of the world are important, and where the exchange rate 
plays a prominent role in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.”, as 
argued by Svensson (2000, p. 157).     
However, this work has attained some evidences in contrast with the expected 
role of exchange rates into the Taylor rule, that is, the findings highlighted the pro-
cyclical response of Selic levels to exchange rate fluctuations over time. Therefore, 
the BCB’s preferences are for output stabilization or expansion and against 
inflation control, despite the existing inflation targeting regime in Brazil. 
Furthermore, although the Subprime crisis has presented an effect on Selic levels, 
by reducing them, such an effect did not change the pro-cyclical reaction of the 
BCB to the other relevant variables into the Taylor rule. Hence, we can conclude 
that the Brazilian monetary policy has experienced a kind of turning-point over the 
last years towards a worse nature, especially compared with Minella et al. (2003) 
and Holland (2005), which studied the first years of inflation targeting in Brazil 




i Thus, et is the nominal exchange rate, and its increase means a devaluation of the domestic currency 
vis-à-vis the foreign one. 
ii However, we can regard Taylor principles, rather than the Taylor principle, as a more general 
definition, which includes the desired countercyclical response of the basic interest rate to all 
relevant variables ultimately determining inflation rates, and not only to expected and/or observed 
inflation. 
iii Such a sample was adopted because in this period the Brazilian consumer inflation target was stable 
at 4.5% per year. 
iv The New and West (1987) estimator is also consistent for correcting problems of heteroscedasticity 
in time series. 
v The exception is Furlani et al. (2010), in which, by applying Bayesian methods, the output gap 
coefficient presents high positive values, thereby demonstrating an expressive counter-cyclical 
monetary policy. In such a context, it is possible to say at least that there is no consensus in relation 
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